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The Romanticized Plato 
   
Peter Cheyne 
 
Abstract 
This paper argues for a reading of Coleridge that not only claims a philosophical lineage 
going back to Plato, but also that one which recognizes that Coleridge modified the Platonic 
epistemology and ontology to yield a philosophical frame for Romanticism. An analysis of Plato’s 
Divided Line passage in Book VII of the Republic provides a scheme for Plato’s scheme of 
knowledge and being, and this is shown to lie behind, with modifications, Coleridge’s polar 
scheme of the mental faculties (1).  It is argued that Romanticism is not only a movement with a 
Platonic heritage, but also that it is a modification of Platonism, the major difference being a new 
understanding of the imagination more consonant with Plato’s actual use of poetic description, symbol, 
and myth, followed by the elevation of this imagination to a position above the understanding, Plato’s 
dianoia. By recasting the Divided Line that harmonizes the faculties into a polar scheme, Coleridge 
returned a dignity to aisthesis, sensory intuition, such that it could be recognized as the unselfconscious 
counterpart of reason, able to recognize beauty in the sensible, and to have a sense––although largely 
without comprehension, first principles, or even logical consistency––of meaning and value. 
 
 
 
Reading a Romantic Plato is possible in two different but complementary 
ways. There is the Plato of the Romantics, that is, Plato as read through and 
interpreted by the Romantic philosophers and poets. There is also the proto-Romantic 
Plato, anticipating the nineteenth century Romantics by over two thousand years and 
influencing them directly, as well as through the neo-Platonists, such as Plotinus (204 
– 270); the Italian Renaissance humanists such as Marsilio Ficino (1433 – 1499) and 
his Florentine Academy, recreating of the Academy of Plato, and Pico della Mirandola 
(1463 -1494); the German mystic, Jakob Böhme (1575 -1624); and the Cambridge 
Platonists, most notably Henry More (1614 -1687) and Ralph Cudworth (1617-1689).  
There are elements throughout Plato, and specific passages in his works, that can be 
read as proto-Romantic. There is also a proto-Romantic strain throughout Plato in the 
dynamic and creative tension between rational, intellectual philosophy and its 
expressions in impassioned and imagistic poetic form. 
Here I examine how Platonism was transformed in the hands of the 
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Romantics. The most important of these changes was in the role of imagination.  
Through imagination as Coleridge recast it, Ideas can affect the understanding. 
Without this imaginative act, the understanding is the lower understanding only, 
remaining at the level of concepts and abstractions as though this were the end and 
apex of thinking, which is, of course, Coleridge's criticism of empiricism. I examine a 
central schema of Plato’s epistemology and ontology, the Divided Line analogy, and 
argue that Coleridge creatively recast this schema, mainly by finding a higher role for 
a radically re-thought imagination. The result of this recasting can be described as a 
Romantic Platonism. 
Authors such as Mary Ann Perkins (2), and R. M. Hare (3) have argued for a 
reading of “two Platos”. I basically sympathize with such readings, as I find both a 
creative tension in Plato between the sometimes quite dry search for definitional 
clarity, and metaphysical precision, and the poetic turns taken when Plato wishes to 
gesture towards ineffables such as the state of contemplating the Forms, the 
confrontation with Beauty, or the encounter with a daimonic conscience. However, I 
prefer not to talk of “two Platos”, because that binary phrase is not subtle enough 
express the notion of the creative tension as being always present in Plato.  In my 
opinion the creative tension is not so much a creative tension in one man, Plato, but a 
dynamic seen to be necessarily present, if pursued in good faith, in the nature of the 
problems he pursued. 
James Vigus has recently published a book about the influence of Plato on 
Coleridge, and he does a very good job of tracing Plato’s influence within the 
Coleridgean corpus (4). I agree with Vigus that Coleridge’s Platonism was genuine, 
and I add that Coleridge then modified Platonism, sometimes in the light of Plotinus, 
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sometimes in the lights of Kant and Schelling, towards the direction of German and, 
from his and Wordsworth’s own creative endeavours, British Romanticism. 
Raymond Geuss has fairly recently continued what I believe to be the mistaken, 
Nietzschean (and what Geuss calls post-Romantic (5)), interpretation of Plato that 
holds that Plato championed propositional knowledge as the ideal and apex of all 
ethical and practical life. This I believe to be mistaken because for Plato the highest 
form of knowledge, noesis and its eventual contemplation of the Forms, is ultimately 
non-propositional, despite the epistemological ascent to this position through 
conceptual dianoia and logical dialectic. I partially agree with Geuss’s position that 
Plato considered poetry to be ‘not a reliable vehicle for correct knowledge’ and that 
the ‘Romantics tried to reverse Plato’s specific account of poetry and its valuation, 
claiming that it was an important kind of knowledge’ (6). However, the reality is not 
so simple, especially when considering Plato’s use of elevated, poetic language to 
symbolically convey the perhaps otherwise ineffable views from the summits, as it 
were, in his dialogues.   
The poetry of Diotima’s instruction, to Socrates, on the ladder of love, in the 
Symposium; the winged charioteer of the Phaedrus symbolizing the soul’s spirited 
ascent to contemplation of the Forms as an ascent occasioned by the encounter with 
Love and Beauty; the allegory of the prisoners in the cave in the Republic to show the 
political task of the philosopher as having to descend back into the cave and point out 
the illusory, shadowy nature of what is being taken for reality; the myth of the 
demiurge in the Timaeus to convey the theoretical role of the Forms as not creating 
the world, but as being needed for the order experienced in it: these are passages of 
the greatest poetical genius. While Plato knew he ought to use the clearest 
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propositional language as far as it could take him, he was equally certain that 
propositional explication could not take us all the way, as far as the dialectic goes. 
My argument is basically that Romanticism can be understood as a 
modification of Platonism. I propose that Coleridge made some of those important 
modifications to Platonism to fashion a Romantic mood and system out of the 
Platonic system. Ernst Cassirer insightfully commented that ‘To poeticize philosophy 
and to philosophize poetry –– such was the highest aim of all romantic thinkers’ (7).  
This is an accurate description that can be verified by tracing the development of 
philosophical concerns throughout Romantic poetry, as well as explicitly in 
Schelling’s assertion of Art as the highest expression of a culture’s philosophy, and in 
Coleridge’s self-declared mission, in Biographia Literaria, requiring the difficult 
pursuit after the rigorous logic of poetry. 
One of Coleridge’s key modifications to Platonism was to place his 
Romantically reconceived category of Imagination between Plato’s levels of noesis 
(reason) and dianoia (mathematical and scientific understanding), perhaps even 
straddling both. The dividing lines are not to be conceived strictly. Indeed it is well to 
recall Coleridge’s maxim that, ‘It is a dull and obtuse mind, that must divide in order 
to distinguish; but it is a still worse, that distinguishes in order to divide’ (8). 
The point is not to stress an insistence on a fragmented mind, but to show 
first a Platonic and then a Romantic (Coleridgean) model of mind, to see how the 
latter is a modification of the former, how both show different models for the unified, 
harmonic nature of that mind, and how the Coleridgean remodeling provided a system 
resulting in a Romanticized Platonism. To explore this modification is to follow the 
direction of the changes made, and to consider the meaning of these changes 
96 
 
concerning the dynamics of the whole system. 
A creative tension is evident in Plato’s writings that can be felt in his 
epistemology, and throughout his works. It is the tension between the mystical and the 
logical. This tension is doubtless partly related to Plato’s attraction to Pythagoreanism, 
with its tendency to number mysticism, the belief that number is the fundamental 
constituent of the universe, and that the harmony of the spheres is the result of the 
mathematico-musical order held to be found in the cosmos. The Pythagorean School 
held that number is mystical. On the mystical side of Platonism is the example of 
Socrates’ daimon, like a call of conscience, which brought him to a trance when he 
said or was about to say something “offensive to the gods”. The original meaning of 
‘mystikos’ was ‘closed lips/eyes’ and later meant an initiate, and describes in literal 
terms a response to the acknowledgement of the ineffable. The inspiration described 
in the Ion, a dialogue exploring how the rhapsodist can persuade the audience, is an 
example of pre-philosophical, rhapsodic persuasion that works, so the analogy went, 
like a kind of magnetism, transmitting the inspiration of the poet to the audience.  
The Socratic trance of the daimon experience is of a higher level, and is taken by 
Plato to be something more mysterious. Rhapsodic persuasion can be understood as a 
kind of human magnetism or hypnotism, lulling reason to sleep, but the moral 
intuition that Socrates was described to have experienced is one that awakens reason 
to the Good. An example of this is outlined in the Phaedrus.   
R.M. Hare saw this tension as leading to two ways of interpreting Plato, 
which then leads to a view of two Platos, Pato and Lato. The one interpretation of 
Plato is of an eternity inspired mystic advocating an ascetic life of mystical 
contemplation, eschewing worldly opinion and ambition. This interpretation is one 
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perhaps originally exaggerated to by the religious Gnostics, which view (the also 
mystical) Plotinus attacked as simplistic and reductive, with the Gnostics interpreting 
Plato as proposing that the phenomenal world is a dreary prison for the divine spark 
of soul (9). Hare suggests that this mystical Plato “would have been at home in a Zen 
Buddhist monastery” (10). The “other” Plato pursues analytic philosophy, is 
concerned with definitions and problems of linguistic meaning, and skillfully employs 
dialectic method to unravel ethical, ontological, and epistemological problems, 
revealing their aporia, and is more often than not more content to leave a problem 
unsolved, but now more clearly comprehended, than to propose theories or to be 
otherwise dogmatic. 
Hare presents a breezy, cheerful account of two Platos, but this account risks 
missing the point of the one Plato working within a creative tension of currents. By 
proposing that the pursuit of definition and the exploration of positions through 
dialectic is that of a rational, analytic Plato, one could easily miss the point that the 
purpose of dialectic is to ‘follow the argument wherever, like a wind, it may lead us’ 
(11). The logic of dialectic leads the participants in directions, with its turns and 
returns, that are not always comfortable. It is not a dry, professionally academic 
process that necessarily excludes the possibility of ‘spiritual journey’. Hadot has 
described the Socratic dialectic of Plato’s dialogues as ‘spiritual exercise’, indeed as a 
‘Way of Life’ (12). The pursuit of dialectic sometimes benumbs the participant, with 
the exposing of aporia in their arguments and definitions leading to a feeling of being 
stung by a stingray. This process of elenchus, or cross-examination, in dialectic is 
used to show up aporia or ignorance and from this, newly recognized, startling 
position, to foster a desire for genuine examination, both self-examination of virtues, 
98 
 
beliefs and opinions, as well as examination of external states of affairs. The elenchus 
and continuation of dialectic is a spiritual exercise in the sense of being a 
philosophical pilgrim’s progress.   
Mary Ann Perkins challenges, following Bernstein (13), a 
modern-postmodern view of Plato as the villain of philosophy who elevated reason to 
an absolute power and who inflicted an ideal of universals, grand schemes, and 
absolutes onto subsequent thinking. Perkins identifies this anti-Platonic view with a 
twentieth century move, particularly in Continental Philosophy, against logocentrism, 
best exemplified in Derrida, deconstructing Platonism, the Enlightenment, and 
Romanticism. Over 150 years earlier, Coleridge was defending Plato against charges 
of ‘estranging the mind from sober experiences’ and that Plato was indeed ‘inductive 
throughout’ (14). 
Perkins argues that Coleridge’s “other Plato” warns against the atomizing 
experience into only phenomena from the senses, and with “unmitigated hostility […] 
pursues the assumptions, abstractions, generalities, and verbal legerdemain of the 
sophists!”( 15). This was the Plato who, in recognizing the unity of the True and the 
Good, paved the way for Kant’s deontological ethics, showing how a non-empirical 
ethical system can be reached by pure practical reason. For Perkins, Coleridge’s 
preferred “other Plato” is opposed to that reading of Plato which represents him as 
representing the absolute, the universal, and the eternal. The “other Plato” is taken as 
understanding that the objects of noesis cannot be represented, for any representation 
would be in concepts and images, abstractions, and thus fall short of the measure of 
the noemata. Hence, the “other Plato” often discusses the movement towards the 
noemata, the Ideas, with self-consciously poetic symbolism, allegories and similes.  
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The misrepresentation of Plato in Coleridge’s day perhaps was partly derived from the 
empirical tendency to understand symbolism as abstraction from phenomenal 
experience. In this case, as abstraction, Plato’s symbolic passages would necessarily 
be merely fanciful and fallacious, however, Coleridge’s point is that Plato’s 
symbolism was not pushed from behind, from sense experience and abstractions 
therefrom, but was pulling upwards to indicate Ideas, the final ascent to which could 
not be present in any concept or symbol. 
Perkins attributes the skewed, negative opinions of Plato and Coleridge to a 
‘philosophical collective unconscious’ which, since the seventeenth century, has 
separated reality ‘into a “really real” which is phenomenal, and directly experienced 
[…], on the one hand, and a parallel but entirely subjective reality, on the other.  The 
latter may be emotionally, aesthetically and morally significant but has no claims to 
universality’ (16). Platonism is hence prone to be dubbed “other-worldly”, and 
Coleridge thought to have been better off ‘confining his metaphysical meanderings to 
poetry’ (17). Contrary to this opinion, Coleridge held that he was pursuing an ideal 
Realism, certainly insofar as he, with Plato, held principles to be logically antecedent 
to phenomena. 
Coleridge faced a seemingly insurmountable difficulty in the dogmatic 
empiricism of his day, a day in which Kantianism was not yet widespread in England, 
which presumed that principles can only be abstractions from phenomena, rather than 
being their causes, constitutors and constant regulators. The challenge Coleridge faced 
against this metaphysical prejudice of empiricism was recounted in an entry of his 
Table Talk, recalling a conversation with an acquaintance: 
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He told me that facts gave birth to, and were the absolute ground of, principles; 
to which I said, that unless he had a principle of selection, he would not have 
taken notice of those facts upon which he grounded his principle. You must 
have a lantern in your hand to give light, otherwise all the materials in the 
world are useless, for you cannot find them; and if you could, you could not 
arrange them. “But then,” said Mr. —, “that principle of selection came from 
facts!” — “To be sure!” I replied; “but there must have been again an 
antecedent light to see those antecedent facts. The relapse may be carried in 
imagination backwards forever, but go back as you may you cannot come to a 
man without a previous aim or principle.” (18) 
 
 
Coleridge’s “other Plato” was not only set against the empiricists of the day, 
but also against some of Coleridge’s recent contemporary Enlightenment and 
Romantic philosophers. Coleridge showed Plato symbolically expressing, in his 
dynamic philosophy, the unity of reality as a unity with distinction, as opposed to 
Schelling’s apparently Parmenidean Absolute as a unity of utter sameness, which 
unity Hegel criticized as ‘the night in which all cows are black’ (19).   
The notion of two Platos in Hare seems to be useful at first, in identifying 
different currents at work in Plato, but ultimately must be seen as superficial.  
Perkins’ “two Platos” notion seems to bring us closer to the reality by contrasting not 
two Platos, but two interpretations of Plato. Within the so-called analytic Plato 
operates the current aiming towards ultimate knowledge, via a process that requires 
aporia to be contemplated, ignorance to be recognized, and stubborn, cherished 
opinions to be abandoned as the participants negotiate the rational and spiritual 
obstacle course of dialectic.  
Within the so-called mystical Plato, exhorting the audience to seek 
knowledge in invisible Forms, are quite logical arguments that assert, for example, 
that any, indeed all, sensible examples put forward as examples of Justice are flawed, 
and in some way or other can also be shown to be unjust. Any particular police officer, 
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any particular lawyer, and particular law in any particular nation can be shown to 
suggest Justice, especially when all the particular examples are considered together, 
but will always also be able to be shown as capable of leading to injustice in some 
case or other. That is, the particulars taken to exemplify Justice can always be shown 
to be not universally Just, that is to say, Just in every possible and imaginable 
circumstance. This is not to make the trivial observation that particulars are not 
universals. Plato does not argue the trivial point that particulars are not universals, but 
rather that if we wish to know what, say “intelligence” is, observing examples of 
intelligent men and women will provide an initial guide, but will also lead us astray 
until we then progress from the stage of observing sensibles and move into a more 
general approach dealing with abstracts. And again, from the abstracts, which are 
dealt with according to theories and their schemata with axioms taken for granted in 
subjects such as Geometry, one can progress to another stage, that of dialectic leading 
to noesis, which is taken to be an intuition of Ideas without either a perception of 
sensibles or an imaging of mathematical or conceptual schemata. 
The Phaedrus contains an excellent example of the poetic Plato. Jowett 
summarizes this very well, in his introductory essay to the Laws, ‘the higher art of the 
Phaedrus, in which the summer’s day, and the cool stream, and the chirping of 
grasshoppers, and the fragrance of the agnus castus [chaste tree], and the legends of 
the place are present to the imagination throughout the discourse’ (20). In the 
Phaedrus, Socrates attempts to better Lysias’ speech on love, wherein Lysias argued 
that the beloved should choose a “lover” who is calm, rational, and not really in love.  
In competitive response, Socrates grows eloquent in his speech against eros and in 
support of the non-lover. However, the daimon, Socrates’ inner voice or inner god, 
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stills Socrates’ speech, calling him to silence and reflection before an improved 
argument can be formed. The previous arguments, Socrates realizes, were ‘clever, but 
not wise’. Then Socrates gives the celebrated account of love as an irrational, but 
extraordinary, madness, a divine madness. Plato relates this inspiration of wisdom 
above cleverness to his theory of the Forms. The genuine lover, described as a 
charioteer driving a pair of winged horses, controls the sensual, unruly, Earth-bound 
horse to be kept in harness with the noble, pure, heaven-bound horse. Beyond heaven, 
all is without shape, and can only be “seen” with the intelligent mind. In this state, 
such Forms as Justice, Sophrosune or Self-possession, and Beauty can be 
contemplated. In the analogy, experiencing beauty in another person is a spur to 
contemplation of the Form of Beauty, hence it is argued to be unwise to either eschew 
beauty or to give way to it only sensually. 
This is a progression whose movement is born of poetic imagination and is 
given expressively. What Plato actually meant by dialectic is a topic of perennial 
debate. Popper considered Plato’s dialectic to be based on a doctrine of mystical 
intuition and wrote off Plato as a mystic with totalitarian tendencies (21). By dialectic, 
did Plato mean only an apparently irrational connection to knowledge itself, through 
intuition of the Forms? Or is the movement of dialectic wholly logical, advancing by 
refutations and modifications, as in the very method Popper held as enabling 
progression in science? Evidence for both of these interpretations can be found in 
Plato’s writings, and the creative tension described above works between these 
meanings. The mystical noesis inspired by the daimon in the dramatic dialogues 
shows a proto-Romantic side to Plato, who then expressed this inspiration with poetic 
analogies.   
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With Coleridge developed a rise in the status and function of imagination, 
both in general culture and within the Platonic tradition. From Plato, through Plotinus, 
to the Romantics, the role of imagination grew in importance, finding its high point in 
Coleridge's system.   
This resulted in a Platonism more receptive to exploring and communicating 
ideas in and through the arts than Plato himself advocated. This Romantic, art-friendly 
‘Plato’ (cf. Mary Ann Perkins’ “other Plato”) became an idealized figure for 
Romantics from Schelling to Shelley. Plato explored questions of the highest 
philosophical and intellectual order by using the form of the dramatic dialogue, rather 
than first-person, scholarly exposition. This method remains true to the Socratic 
intuition that education, as educare, or drawing out, and especially within philosophy, 
is more akin to midwifery, the profession of Socrates mother, than to the attempt to 
fill their charges with knowledge as jugs to empty vessels as the sophists professed 
they were doing. 
Plato recognizes the need in philosophy for the moods of wonder, of 
amazement, of being shocked and dumbfounded, and even of that philosophic frenzy 
exemplified by Diotima, the mantic priestess. Far from Plato representing the 
denigration of human emotion in favour of a pure, mathematical reason replacing all 
organic lines with right angles and integers, Plato presents a higher synthesis of a 
material, sensible, chaotic world given intelligibility insofar as it has a formality 
through the Ideas, the laws of phenomena that are not themselves phenomena. For 
Plato, spiritedness, receptiveness to sensual love and beauty, and the mood of wonder 
are important motors for the highest noesis of the philosophical attitude. Hence the 
appeal of Plato to the Romantics who sought to unite deep feeling with profound 
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thought.   
In discussing what he recognized as the particular genius of Wordsworth’s 
poetry, Coleridge wrote that, ‘it was the union of deep feeling with profound thought, 
the fine balance of truth in observing, with the imaginative faculty in modifying the 
objects observed’ (22). Wordsworth saw reason in passion in much the same way as 
Plato, in dialogues such as Phaedrus and Symposium, saw that cleverness is not the 
same thing as wisdom, and that wisdom is present in such “divine madness” as love 
and philosophical frenzy. Wordsworth spoke of ‘passion, which itself / Is highest 
reason in a soul sublime’ (23). ‘O for some Sun’, called Coleridge, seeking for 
wisdom with love, the intelligible with the sensual, ‘that shall unite Light and 
Warmth’ (24).  From here we can see the natural connections and affinities which led 
to the Romantic embracing of Platonic themes such as the unity of Truth and Beauty, 
explicit in Keat’s ‘Ode to a Grecian Urn’; and which explain Shelley’s devoted 
translations of Plato’s Ion and Symposium. Shelley called Plato, ‘essentially a poet’ in 
a tract that I would like to quote from at length as it exemplifies so well the 
connections between the Platonizing Romantics and the proto-Romantic Plato: 
 
The distinction between poets and prose writers is a vulgar error. The distinction 
between philosophers and poets has been anticipated. Plato was essentially a 
poet—the truth and splendor of his imagery, and the melody of his language, are 
the most intense that it is possible to conceive. He rejected the measure of the 
epic, dramatic, and lyrical forms, because he sought to kindle a harmony in 
thoughts divested of shape and action, and he forebore to invent any regular plan 
of rhythm which would include, under determinate forms, the varied pauses of 
his style. Cicero sought to imitate the cadence of his periods, but with little 
success. Lord Bacon was a poet.  His language has a sweet and majestic rhythm, 
which satisfies the sense, no less than the almost superhuman wisdom of his 
philosophy satisfies the intellect; it is a strain which distends, and then bursts the 
circumference of the reader’s mind, and pours itself forth together with it into the 
universal element with which it has perpetual sympathy. All the authors of 
revolutions in opinion are not only necessarily poets as they are inventors, nor 
even as their words unveil the permanent analogy of things by images which 
participate in the life of truth; but as their periods are harmonious and rhythmical, 
and contain in themselves the elements of verse; being the echo of the eternal 
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music. Nor are those supreme poets, who have employed traditional forms of 
rhythm on account of the form and action of their subjects, less capable of 
perceiving and teaching the truth of things, than those who have omitted that 
form. Shakespeare, Dante, and Milton (to confine ourselves to modern writers) 
are philosophers of the very loftiest power. A poem is the very image of life 
expressed in its eternal truth (25). 
 
 
The Romantics were drawn to the unity of opposites they read in Plato: the 
epistemology written in dramatic form; the synthesis of reason and passion; the poetic 
passages to continue where rational argument with literal concepts must give way to 
the symbolic. Coleridge's scheme, his counterpart to Plato’s Divided Line, is a 
polarity with harmonies between the extremes, and the two middle sections on either 
side, and on the two parts that meet in the centre. Thus in Coleridge's writings, it is 
made explicit that reason is present in sense, and in that way, sense is closer to its 
opposite in the scale (reason) than to its neighbour (fancy). While such harmonies 
might be imagined in Plato's system, they are never explicit in Plato's writings. 
Hence we can see Coleridge's scheme as a modification of Plato's that (a) 
allows artistic activity to co-operate in the highest intellectual activity, as argued by 
Schelling: because ‘aesthetic intuition is merely intellectual intuition become 
objective, it is self-evident that art is at once the only true and eternal organ and 
document of philosophy, which ever and again continues to speak to us of what 
philosophy cannot depict in external form [...]. Art is paramount to the philosopher 
[...] it is art alone which can succeed in objectifying with universal validity what the 
philosopher is able to present in a merely subjective fashion’ (26); and (b) allows 
phenomena to appear from out of natural laws as ideal reality in an organic fashion in 
a way that does not conceive phenomena as comprising a “second world”. 
This point allows for a discussion of the Plato of the Romantics and whether 
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Romanticized Plato might be a modification of Plato, or an exploration of one aspect 
of Plato, the proto-Romantic Plato. The Romantic return to Platonism was seen as 
both a correction to empiricism and a progression from Kant. 
Coleridge's polar diagram elegantly communicates the Romantic return to 
Platonism and the major difference between this Romantic Platonism and Plato's 
scheme in the Divided Line is obvious, namely, the elevated place of imagination. The 
preceding page shows Plato’s Divided Line above Coleridge’s harmonic polarity of 
the mental powers that he sketched out while reading Tennemann’s Geschichte der 
Philosophie. I propose that Coleridge’s scheme is a modification of Plato’s Divided 
Line that both Romanticizes Plato and develops a Romantic scheme from Platonism.  
In the tables above, Coleridge wrote out the order of mental powers twice, in opposite 
orders, in order to emphasize the harmonies between the poles. Note also that both 
tables are best written out vertically, rather than horizontally, but for sake of clarity 
regarding reading the words I wrote this out horizontally. This relation of Coleridge’s 
scheme to Plato’s Divided Line has not previously been made in the secondary 
literature, nor was it mentioned by Coleridge, but I believe it is an important tool in 
both showing and exploring how Coleridge fashioned his Romanticism out of a 
proto-Romantic Platonism that needed a few tweaks, such as the elevation of the 
imaginative faculty, to become appropriate for the anti-mechanistic, post-Kantian 
Romantic movement of the nineteenth century. 
The influence of Plotinus on Coleridge is apparent. Plotinus quietly passed 
over Plato's imitative theory of poetic-artistic representation, his own theory 
proposing that poetic-artistic creation springs from the same reason-principles, or laws, 
as nature itself. This would be no mere reproduction, but aesthetic production forming 
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its material. Thus for Plotinus, beauty in poetic-artistic representation and beauty in 
nature develop from the same principles. Plotinus argued in the Enneads that the 
aesthetic contemplation of art and nature leads beyond merely discursive reason and 
on towards the Ideas, or reason-principles, which neo-Platonic argument also appears 
in Schelling, as mentioned above. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plotinus quiet modification of Plato on the subject of whether imagistic 
representation must be merely mimetic is an early prefiguring of the Romantic 
direction. Plotinus did not reject outright Plato’s position of imagistic representation 
as mimetic, as we can see in Ennead, IV. 3.10, where Plotinus describes the imitations 
of art as dim and feeble copies, mere eidola (idols) as so many “toys”. Again, this 
time in Ennead, V. 9.11, Plotinus joins painting and sculpture to dancing and mime as 
art forms that take their models from the outward appearances of the world of sense in 
contrast to the higher art form of music, which takes the intelligibility of the essences, 
the Reason-Principles of things, as its models. Here also, Plotinus raises architecture 
and carpentry above painting, sculpture, dance, and mime, because the productive arts 
are founded on the Ideal principles of proportion, and moreover, their aim is actuality, 
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not appearance, and they take their model from the Idea, the purpose, function, and 
necessary properties, of a building, of a bed, and so on, rather than imitating any 
appearance, which position is basically the same as that expounded by Plato in 
Republic, Book X, namely, that of the carpenter’s bed as being less far removed from 
reality than the doubly mimetic bed of the painter. So far Plotinus does not diverge 
from Plato’s explicitly stated views regarding imagistic representation.   
However, Plotinus’ explicit statements on the subject go beyond what Plato 
explicitly stated. Whether or not what Plotinus says about artistic production goes 
against Plato is a matter of debate, and there is no doubt that Plotinus would have 
been sure that his position was certainly in the spirit of Plato and exemplified Plato’s 
own practices as witnessed in the dialogues. Audrey Rich brings together the 
materials in Plotinus to describe his distinctively neo-Platonic contribution to 
aesthetics (27). Plotinus, there is no doubt, considered himself a Platonist, and would 
not have considered himself to have contributed anything un-Platonic to that school of 
philosophy. Nevertheless, the Plotinian theory of artistic creation is to be considered a 
novel contribution, one which came from out of Platonism, but was not in the original 
Platonic corpus itself. For Plotinus, the artist bases the work not on the material model, 
but on the contemplation of the Ideal and the principles of the thing portrayed. Rich 
points to Plotinus’ example of the sculptor Phidias (28). His celebrated statue of Zeus 
was based on no human model, but was an attempt to convey how Zeus would appear, 
were he to manifest himself to us. Art remains a kind of mimesis, but it is a first-hand 
mimesis, contemplating the Ideas themselves and giving them sensible expression.  
However, Plotinus’ view goes deeper than that, as in Ennead, V, 8.1, he states that 
artists do not merely reproduce the model, but indeed ‘run back to the principles from 
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which the natural objects derive.’ Here we have a model of artistic creation that is not 
so much copying as running in parallel with its depicted subject. The artist calls upon 
the principles of creation which created the model, draws them together in her 
imagination, and uses these principles to recreate the object in a different material 
setting.  Rather than being a copy of a copy, genuine art is a copy of the essence 
itself, or even a parallel of the essence itself. I do not wish to push this idea of artistic 
creation as a kind of parallel creation in Plotinus to far, because, for Plotinus, 
‘something ugly that is alive is actually preferable to a beautiful statue’ (29). Still, we 
can see that in a modified Platonic view, artistic production is more imaginative than 
imitative. Indeed, it could be considered erroneous to judge Plato’s statements 
regarding imagistic reproduction and stylization as referring to what we, and Plotinus, 
called art, because Plato did not have the concept of “Art” that we are now using. 
However that point may be taken, certainly we can detect see a lineage from Plato to 
Plotinus to Coleridge’s theory of the imagination, involving an imaginative 
contemplation of the principles within the subject of the artistic work, and not merely 
a skillful depiction of its outward forms. 
This division in Platonism is not, I think, one quietly introduced by a Plotinus 
wishing to both remain faithful to Plato and keep his devotion to aesthetic 
contemplation. It can be argued that it comes from a tension enjoyed by Plato himself 
in some of the more dramatic and poetic scenes in his dialogues. The most relevant to 
consider here is when Socrates is seduced from his wonted urban environment to 
follow Phaedrus beyond the city walls and discourse along the river bank between a 
cypress and a plane tree. Socrates is seduced by the chance of a good discussion as 
Phaedrus holds in his hand the script of a speech on love recently made by Lysias, yet 
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of the proposal to hold this discussion in the countryside, where he fears his reason 
might fall under the sway of river nymphs, he objects: ‘the landscapes and trees have 
nothing to teach me, only people do’, (Phaedrus, 230d). In the spirit of this scene of 
natural riverside beauty, in a spot between the chaste tree and the plane tree, with the 
general topic of the lover and the beloved, we see Socrates move from merely rational, 
self-interested logic to an impassioned, elevated logic inspired by Socrates’ feeling the 
warning sign from his daimon. Had he continued the speech in favour of the rational 
detachment of the non-lover, he would have offended something sacred. Socrates 
begins again, this time wholly in favour of a spirited love that might sometimes 
appear to have a touch of madness, but this is a divine madness, like poetry or 
prophecy. Without doubt, Plato relished inscribing this dramatic irony, having 
Socrates's daimon chide his first, too coldly logical speech, and inspire Socrates to 
sing his paean to the divine madness in love and poetry. Here we have the 
proto-Romantic Plato, beloved of Schelling, Coleridge, Keats, and Shelley. 
Plato's model of thought and thinking is implicit throughout his writings and 
is most explicit when he directly discusses epistemology. In such passages as the 
Analogy of the Divided Line in the Republic, Book VI; the Phaedrus Analogy of the 
Charioteer struggling to steer the white, noble winged horse and the dark, dappled, 
earthy one; and the Ladder of Love in the Symposium, Platonic epistemology and 
ontology are seen to be inextricably related. The Theaetetus is a dialogue discussing 
the nature of knowledge. It is almost entirely epistemological, considering theories of 
knowledge as merely perception; knowledge as true judgement; and knowledge as 
true judgement with an account. Here Socrates argues against Theaetetus’ theory (and 
a related Protagorean, relativistic argument) that knowledge is nothing but perception.  
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The Theaetetus is Plato’s purest exploration of epistemology, elsewhere in Plato the 
epistemology is always intermixed with ontology. 
Knowledge is then considered as true judgment, but this is also dismissed, as 
one might by pure luck be possessed of true judgement, with no way to distinguish it 
from false beliefs. Eventually, the definition of knowledge as ‘true judgment with an 
account’ is also seen to be unsatisfactory, because defining ‘an account’ as 
‘knowledge of the distinctions of the thing to be known’ would make a circular 
argument. The Platonic ontology of the Forms does not have a strong presence in this 
dialogue. In the Theaetetus we can read a presentation of epistemology carefully 
isolated from ontology. This epistemological argument follows an explicit progress 
through a dialectic advanced by Socrates playing midwife to the young Theaetetus’ 
search to clarify what is and what is not knowledge.    
In the Divided Line passage of the Republic, we see a simple rendering of 
Plato’s epistemology as it relates to his ontology, the theory of Forms. This passage 
may be read both epistemologically and ontologically. The Divided Line, with its four 
main divisions, represents stages along the way towards knowledge: from shadows 
and reflections; to the visible three-dimensional things that cause these images; 
through concepts derived from these and mathematical notions as refinements of 
these; to the knowledge of the Forms themselves. To read the Divided Line as 
progressing through stages of human awareness is to read it epistemologically. This 
direction moves from murky, distorted apprehensions of reality to an increasingly 
general, abstract, clear knowledge of reality, culminating in the contemplation of the 
Forms and the Form of the Good. Obviously epistemology and ontology are 
intertwined in the analogy of the Divided Line. The ontological reading would be in 
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reverse order, beginning with the most real in Plato’s system, the Form of the Good, 
and the other Forms; then descending through mathematical notions and general 
classes of things; to the individual, sensible things; which in turn create the shadows, 
reflections and basic images from which we humans begin our individual 
epistemological adventures. 
Plato's Divided Line, read epistemologically, moves from aesthesis and doxa 
(sense perception and belief) about eikasia and pistis (images and opinions relating to 
perceived objects), through dianoia (logical reasoning and scientific, abstracting, 
empirical approaches) involving mathematika (concepts to be found in mathematics 
and in the empirical generalizations of science), and finally to reason's dialectical 
attainment to noetic knowledge of the Forms. In this direction, following the 
epistemological current that builds towards true knowledge, we read the line starting 
from shadowy acquaintance with sense data, images and reflections, which basic 
forms of acquaintance yield imagining and perception. Plato’s model then moves 
through the common sense ‘animal faith’ of belief and opinion regarding perceptions.  
Beyond this stage, conceptualization leads to thinking, after empirical generalizations 
produce the schemata required by science and the technical arts. Then dianoia, 
rational thinking, produces the elements and formulae of mathematics. Finally, 
through dialectic and through sustained contemplation, there is the stage of episteme, 
which allows for a noesis, or rational intuition, of the Forms, and, ultimately, the 
Good or the Form of Forms.   
When read ontologically, the movement through the divided line is to be 
understood in the reverse order. Reading the divided line ontologically is to see it as a 
model of reality with its reflections and shadows cast into faculties of mind 
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corresponding to levels of reality. In the order of thinking, proposes Plato's model, we 
tend to move from images, through opinion, to concepts, to pure science, to that 
imageless contemplation or noesis that is, he asserted, to be won through dialectic.  
This is a movement from shadows, reflections, images, and opinions, through 
conceptual and dianoetic refinements, to noetic contemplation.  
However, the order of our usual thinking is an order that traces backwards, 
from what is most obvious and apparent (phenomena) to what is not phenomenal at all, 
and is the dialectical opposite of appearance. Usually our thinking moves inductively 
from appearances to concepts and plans, or rules. In the order of being, rather than of 
thinking, Plato’s dynamic moves the other way, from the higher forms, through 
mathematical and then empirical concepts, to physical objects and then their images, 
shadows and reflections.  That is, from sun, as it were, to shadow. It should also be 
kept in mind that while the epistemological movement can properly be described as 
having the movement outlined above, the ontological movement in Plato should be 
understood only metaphorically as movement and transition. The epistemological 
movement really is a transition from basic intuitions to more cognitive and developed 
levels of acquaintance with and knowledge of images, objects, concepts, and Ideas.  
We can see this movement in studies of child development, such as in Jean Piaget’s 
psychological work in what he called genetic epistemology. The movement along the 
epistemological direction really is a movement because it requires and takes time; it 
moves along stages. But following the other direction, the ontological direction, the 
movement can only be metaphorical. For Plato, the ultimate reality is, and all of its 
epiphenomena, its concepts, reflections, shadows, and images exist simultaneously, 
rather than being progressing through stages that must take time to develop. 
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Forms do not become concepts, objects, and then images, in Plato’s system, 
although concepts and phenomena (veridical or confused) are existentially dependent 
upon the Forms. Thinking about thinking about being (epistemology), in Plato, 
involves studying transitions of ever-closer approximations to truth from shadowy 
acquaintance, through doxic and conceptual comprehensions, to noesis. Thinking 
about being (the exercise of ontology) as such is in a sense always going to be off 
balance, external to where it intends to be, because it is thinking about being instead 
of being the being, until, that is, the ideal attainment of noesis, when the Idea in the 
mind is, ideally, identical to the object of contemplation. Whereas a concept is a 
concept of a thing, or rather of a class of thing, and is separate from the thing, or class, 
itself, providing philosophers with the epistemological gap, such a gap does not exist 
with the Platonic Idea and its apprehension or contemplation.   
Of course, “Idea” is a sometimes troublesome translation of “eidos”, and 
“Form” provides difficulties too, both words being all too familiar, hence easily 
misunderstood. “Idea” is not to be understood as a purely mental occurrence, as when 
someone “has an idea.” There would be Ideas, whether or not there were philosophers 
to think them. Noesis of a Form or Idea is not a thinking that is separate from its 
object, unlike someone now thinking in an office of the actual Eiffel Tower in Paris, 
as opposed to just thinking its image. Coleridge described this important Platonic 
nuance when he argued that it is the “Queen Bee in the hive of error” to think that the 
same Idea in two minds would be two different Ideas. Another way of putting this is 
to stress that while the attainment and development of knowledge, studied in 
epistemology, is a process that requires time, this is not something that can be said of 
ultimate reality, modeled in ontology, according to Plato's model. 
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As in Plato, Coleridge's writings are united by the motif of thinking about 
thinking, with Platonic and neo-Platonic strains being the dominant tendencies.  
Coleridge's scheme of types, or faculties, of thought from fancy, through the 
understanding in its lower and higher forms, then imagination and finally reason 
provides a model that I read as being a Romantic recasting of the Platonic scheme of 
thinking from Sense to Reason, remodeling Plato’s scheme from eikasia to noesis. 
Plato's model is a deliberate polarity wherein the distinctions between the 
perception of changeable sensible objects and the thinking of stable intelligibles 
(concepts and Forms) are offered a setting and a solution. It is a deliberate polarity 
because he carefully inscribed in the Divided Line his solution to what he saw as a 
central problem in the possibility of knowledge. Plato saw a disparity between the 
flux of sensible objects versus their stable universal concepts, and sought to solve this 
disparity with a polarity. Coleridge's scheme is also a deliberate polarity between the 
intelligible Forms and the objects of sense. In Coleridge's system the intelligible 
Forms include, as well as Plato's eide (Ideas), natural laws as things which are real but 
not strictly phenomenal, and which give rise to phenomena. For example, in 
gravitation, gravity itself is never seen, it a law, not a phenomenon, and it gives rise to 
phenomena such that understanding the law helps to understand the phenomena.  
‘Plato treats principally of the truths, as it is manifested at the ideal pole, as the 
science of intellect’, Coleridge noted, whereas Bacon applied himself, ‘to the same 
truth, as it is manifested at the other, or material pole, as the science of nature.’  
Coleridge was impressed that Plato wrote of ‘Living Laws’, and that Bacon termed, 
‘the laws of nature, Ideas’ (30). Coleridge here provided a refreshing view on Plato’s 
Theory of Ideas, appealing to many engaged in a mathematical study of the laws 
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behind phenomena that could not themselves be phenomena. 
While in Plato the affinities between eikasia and noesis are neither obvious 
nor elucidated, in Coleridge the affinities between sense and reason are never 
forgotten.  These relations are described as harmonious, with the higher being 
detectable, though not self-conscious, in the lower. This is to say that Coleridge argues 
for harmonies of Form and reason between the phenomena of sense and the 
movement of reason. In Coleridge, there can be more easily appreciated an impression 
of reason—of logos, law, ratio and idea—in the phenomena of aisthesis that is 
implicit in Plato but is not drawn out into an explicit topic of discussion until the 
neo-Platonists. An impression of reason in aesthesis would come from hints of rhyme 
and reason in our qualitative and subjective experience. It is not surprising that a 
Romantic poet, engaged in poetizing sense experience, and uniting this poetry with 
philosophical interests, expressed the idea of such a harmony. 
This idea is not explicit in Plato’s writings, and the case for an interpretation 
finding it implicitly there would not be persuasive to many. There are hints, most 
notably from Aristotle, that Plato's lectures and discussions in the Academy treated of 
the relation between the Good or the One, the Ideas, and phenomena more fully, less 
metaphorically, and as his own developed theory rather than through the devices of 
the dramatic Socrates, Timaeus, or the Stranger. Indeed, in the Timaeus myth, Plato 
argues for an ultimate failure of harmony between the Forms and chaotic matter.  
Plato describes primal chaos being ordered with the Forms by a demiurge. Although 
this order resulted in a world of order that can more or less be understood, an element 
of intractable chaos remains in sensible objects and our feelings related to them.  
Coleridge’s Romantic harmony, on the other hand, has no place for an intractable 
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element of chaos that cannot be harmonized with reason. In Plato’s writings, the 
strongest hints we detect of any harmony between eikasia and noesis are in the 
Symposium, when Socrates relates Diotima’s allegory of the Ladder of Love. In this 
story, beauty is judged to be both perceivable and intelligible: a chink through which 
the Forms can illuminate the sensible, thus providing the first rung on the Ladder of 
Love from sensible and material concerns, up the rungs of intelligible Forms to the 
Sea of Beauty and direct contemplation of the Forms in their pure aspect. 
 
Eikasia 
The object of eikasia, acquaintance with the world through images, is the 
phenomenal as images, eikones, icons. It is the realm, as it were, of colours, shapes, 
sounds, and other sensations taken at face value without critical reflection with respect 
to what they are images of. As such, it is it is naïve; Plato calls it a state of ignorance.   
Eikasia is neither true nor false, being derived from aesthesis, our raw aesthetic 
experience. The sophist in Theaetetus claimed this aisthesis to be all that there is to 
knowledge. In some ways a classical counterpart of Hume, Theaetetus (the dramatic 
character in the eponymous dialogue), influenced by the theories of Heraclitus and 
especially Protagoras, argued that all we can know is what can be apprehended by the 
senses. We can think of aisthesis as imagistic cognition; an intuition prior to 
existential judgments. In eikasia, a parade of icons, there is no claim to truth.  
Eikasia is the beholding of images, being a fixation on the image in the dream, 
memory, reverie, or on the reflection, the shadow, or the painted, poetic, or other 
likeness.  Eikasia is a fixation in so far as it does not contemplate the image as 
merely an image of something else.   
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There is discussion in the secondary literature regarding whether eikasia is an 
illusory misapprehension of the images of things for the objects that they are merely 
likenesses of, or whether something somewhat different is supposed to be going on.  
Hardie suggests that eikasia means ‘conjecture’ in general, so that people in eikasia, 
like the prisoners in the cave, make conjectures, theories, and likely stories about what 
is going on, without necessarily making conjectures regarding any supposed originals 
the existence of which accounts for the appearances of the likenesses (31).   
I take eikasia to be similar to what Heidegger’s described as the state of 
fascination, which state is taken to describe being immersed and absorbed in the 
(usually inherited and unquestioned) concerns of everyday life in its average 
everydayness. In eikasia, we are held, almost held captive, by the appearances and by 
the images. I read eikasia as thus being fascinated by the appearances. The pleasures 
of the sparkles of surface beauty, the pains of everyday frustrations can pull the mind 
into this level where one becomes caught up in concerns at this level without looking 
at the possibilities of reality beyond these appearances. The charms of eikasia involve 
phantasia, the accepting of images and appearances woven into stories. Here is a level 
that can be illuminated with a famous word from Coleridge, speaking of ‘that willing 
suspension of disbelief that constitutes poetic faith’ (32). Polarizing the Divided Line 
gives back a dignity to eikasia’s objects – eikasia, become the Romantic imagination, 
is now also intuition, it also has deep truths, but the epistemological pathema that 
goes with it is the lowest, the least capable of knowing truth, the most ignorant. Two 
points though, Plato in 532c does talk about moving from seeing divine reflections as 
a way to move up to genuine knowledge. At the second point, eikasia’s focus is such 
that the objects in its perspective should be taken not as following along the path of 
119 
 
knowledge to truth (and thence goodness) but rather along the path of appreciation, of 
aesthetics, to beauty (and thence goodness).  
There is neither truth nor falsity in eikasia, but rather a kind of reverie.  In 
this dream-like state, what appears are gignomena, which Plato describes as the things 
which tumble about between being and not being. The eikasia of the Republic, Book 
VI has a broader reference than the aisthesis discussed in relation to the doxa in the 
Theaetetus.  Aisthesis, as defined in the Theaetetus, is a ‘passive affection of the 
mind’(33), and refers to sense impressions, whereas eikasia refers to sense 
impressions of images, but also to mental images, such as those experienced in 
dreams, delirium, and madness. 
The objects of eikasia are described as shadows, reflections, dreams, and 
human productions of likenesses: a painting of a house “is a sort of dream created by 
man for those that are awake” (34).  Plato suggests, in his Divided Line, that as 
eikasia dreams of actual objects, the mathematika of dianoia dream of being (35). 
In the Theaetetus, the objects of aisthesis are colours, sounds, and other 
phenomenal basics. The objects of doxa are contrasted as ta onta, those things which 
have being, because they are held to be more real than the phenomenal basics by 
which we infer their existence. The aisthesis and doxa in the Theaetetus can thus be 
mapped onto the eikasia and pistis of the Divided Line in the Republic. In the 
Republic, eikasia and pistis together represent doxa.  Eikasia takes the images at face 
value, whereas pistis takes the everyday objects and opinions about them at face value. 
Within these two modes of doxa in the Republic, ta onta is now referred to as the true 
object of episteme, beyond both eikasia and pistis. Plato's theory did not change, but 
the context of the discussion changes. In the Republic, doxa is considered within the 
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fuller scheme as a prior stage to episteme, so it becomes, by this fuller relation, less 
appropriate to describe doxa as relating to ta onta. In Theaetetus, doxa is considered 
in relation to aisthesis, with doxa better approximating reality. In the Theaetetus, the 
Forms as the proper objects of genuine knowledge are not mentioned, so it is fitting in 
that narrower context to call the objects of doxa ta onta, in contextual 
contradistinction from the sense-perceptions of aisthesis. In the Republic, we have an 
enlarged context juxtaposing doxa and episteme, with doxa further subdivided into 
pistis and eikasia, neither of which can be seen as knowledge within the larger 
context. 
Eikasia is a primitive, pre-conceptual experience. Noesis is an advanced, 
praeter-conceptual experience. Everyday understanding, as well as the understanding 
of science and mathematics, lies in between. Within the polar scheme of Coleridge 
there is a harmony between the poles of sense and reason such that reason can be said 
to be sleeping or dreaming—that is to say unconscious—within our experience of 
eikasia, which for Coleridge becomes Sense and Fancy, only becoming enlightened 
and awake in self-conscious reason. For Coleridge, there is reason in sense, although 
this reason is ‘sleeping’ or ‘dreaming’. It is difficult to express this meaning clearly, 
and that obscurity is at least part of the Romantic point. Parting company with, or 
perhaps preferring to say modifying, Plato, Coleridge’s Romantic scheme does not see 
Reason as the absolute opposite to Sense, but rather its harmonic opposite.  
Describing the harmony from the other perspective, now looking for Sense in Reason, 
is easier, because the Platonic understanding of Reason at the end of dialectic is of a 
direct intuition without the intermediaries of schemata. Sense intuits phenomena; 
Reason intuits Forms (and in Plato noesis intuits Forms while dianoia imagines Forms, 
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employing, for example, geometrical diagrams, and so on). 
Coleridge's sense of the harmony between aisthesis and Idea allows for a 
Romantic impression of the artist as working through and with Ideas while 
simultaneously remaining within the aesthetic, sensory pole of eikasia. This Romantic 
Platonism is familiar by now, and a modern example can be seen in Thomas Mann's 
Tod in Venedig (1912). The example I refer to is particularly appealing in this context 
because it involves explicit allusions to Plato's Phaedrus which show that Plato at 
least sometimes, and especially during his poetic descriptions, believed the eidos of 
beauty to be accessible to the senses as well as to the intellect. In this scene, the 
intellectual composer and professor of music, von Aschenbach, hopes to recuperate 
his staid passions and tired mind with a vacation to Venice. A beautiful youth, Tadzio, 
captures his fascinated imagination and while on the beach, fully dressed in his suit 
and hat, the professor, at a table incongruously placed on the sand, attempts to create a 
musical composition while apparently the forms of beauty, life, joy, and goodness in 
the classically beautiful youth before him inspire a reverie of Platonic Ideas. 
In Plato, the artist makes no existential claims—universals may be explored, 
but the art is sustained in eikasia. At the level of pistis, on the other hand, exists the 
work, the material object side, of the artwork, rather than the art as such. As with 
Sartre, for the artist in Plato's eikasia the object intended in art exists only in 
imagination. From the level of pistis, the painting, for example, is oil on canvas, an 
historical artifact.   
Coleridge, however, stresses the harmony between sense and 
reason—gignomena (that which passes between being and non-being) and eidos 
(Form). Coleridge can therefore have an account of how the Idea can bring pleasure 
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through artistic expression, and how the artwork as artefact can inspire intellectual 
enjoyment. This account can support the argument in the Symposium that beauty is an 
eidos, yet one that can be seen by the eye as well as by the intellect. 
In eikasia we have a kind of reverie: an ingenuous consciousness.  
Ingenuous because this consciousness makes no interpretative alterations and accepts 
appearances on face value. In Theaetetus, aisthesis is also ascribed to madness and the 
fevered delirium of sickness. Its object is whatever appears, whether in dream, 
delirium, or to the senses. Its object is the 'idea' in the empirical terminology of Locke 
and Hume. A sense of aesthesis and eikasia can be detected in Heidegger's 
'fascination', which is a state of being held captive by the comings and goings of 
average everydayness and being held in the sway of the common interpretations of 
history, reality and morality found around us and taken as given. Plato's eikasia  is a 
state of 'the unexamined life', unquestioningly accepting moral codes as given, and 
this stage is therefore pre-ethical. The condition of the prisoners in the cave, described 
in the Republic just before the Divide Line passage, outlines this aspect of eikasia.  
The prisoners are fascinated with the shadows on the wall and have no intellectual 
tools to criticize their own perspectives and theories of reality from the outside.  
Hegel's project of Phenomenology of Geist is obviously a descendent of the Platonic 
theory of evolution of consciousness according to its objects, and aisthesis/eikasia 
would naturally feel at home in Hegel's stage of 'sense certainty'. 
In eikasia the Heraclitean flux is uncritically reflected in the mind.  For 
Coleridge, this sensory flux is then further dispersed by the fancy, as it generates 
streams of association from this flux.  Plato and Coleridge alike stress the 
impermanent character of the objects of consciousness considered at what might be 
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called the naïve pole of experience. In Plato, the argument presented through Socrates 
was directed against the position that knowledge can only come from and be of the 
objects of the senses, and hence of the necessarily subjective and relativistic nature of 
any possible knowledge. In Coleridge, the argument was against a similar empirical 
position, this time the modern position coming from Locke, Hume, and Hartley. The 
sophist in Theaetetus, as well as the empiricists in and preceding Coleridge's day, 
often argued that the only kind of knowledge possible was that of aisthesis or eikasia, 
and the only possible object was the phenomenal object that Plato here describes. 
While both Plato and Coleridge were arguing against similar empirical 
positions, Plato can be seen to have chosen the tactic of diminishing the importance of 
the sensory along the pole of knowledge, his Divided Line, whereas Coleridge 
Romanticizes this scheme to show that a harmony can be detected between the ends 
of the pole. Coleridge finds intimations of reason in non-reflective aesthetic 
experience and the immediacy of the sensible (without the sensible itself) in the 
intuitions of reason. 
 
Pistis 
The objects of pistis are described in the divided line passage as those things 
made by God, animals, plants, etc., and man-made articles. These are distinguished 
from divine and man-made images, e.g., shadows, reflections, dreams, and painting.  
The objects of Plato's pistis are the actual objects of the ordinary world considered 
apart from their reflections and other images of them.   
While eikasia is fascinated, accepting with neither prejudice nor concern for 
contradiction the phenomena composing its consciousness, pistis is characterised by 
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judgement. The judgements of pistis arrive at doxa, or opinions, by the process of  
“the soul debating with herself,” affirming and denying (36). This process is akin to 
the presence of (unenlightened) negative reason in the lower understanding of 
Coleridge's scheme. Although pistis arrives at judgements by comparing and relating 
perceptions, it does not subject these to any critical analysis. 
Indeed, in the Theaetetus, this mode of doxa is said to contain both an 
element of aisthesis/eikasia and an element of pure thinking (37). The counterpart of 
the element of aisthesis/eikasia in Coleridge's lower understanding would be the fixed 
and definite thoughts fashioned by the fancy associated from the stream of sense. For 
Coleridge, these fixed and definite thoughts work like pre-concepts, or counters, 
pebbles still wet from the stream of sense experience from where they were lifted.  
Within Plato's scheme, the inclusion in pistis of the principles of affirmation 
and denial, corresponding to the presence of negative reason as the principle of 
contradiction in Coleridge's lower understanding, the categories of reality and 
unreality arise in distinction to the level equality of unprejudiced experience in eikasia. 
The prejudice and existential affirmation necessary for judgement arises in pistis, thus 
completing the dynamic of doxa, or opinion. In eikasia a distinction between reality 
and unreality would be meaningless since every appearance is what it is as such, 
appearing or disappearing, not referred in judgement to anything else, yet often 
referred by association or delirium to other phenomena, none of which are 
distinguished in themselves as being either objective or subjective. Objectivity 
requires judgment, which distinguishes subject from object, perception from 
perceived, quality from qualified. 
The judgments of pistis include much of empirical knowledge. It judges a 
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posteriori, asserting that this follows that without necessarily involving any theoretical 
framework or thinking as to why something is the way it is or follows the process it 
does. Pistis is pragmatic, as in the farmer who has true opinions regarding when to 
sow and when to harvest coming from a posteriori judgments. Such opinion may well 
be true, by accident or experiment, but is not concerned with a theoretical account, so 
for Plato it is not knowledge proper. 
Aisthesis/eikasia presents what the empiricists would later call secondary 
qualities, the qualia, about which there can be no question of error. The secondary 
quality is neither more nor less than exactly as it appears, being pure appearance. On 
the other hand, to achieve a judged opinion of something is the style of pistis, 
requiring experience in dealing with the objects. Hence pistis, being object-directed, 
obtains a level of objectivity not present in eikasia. This objectivity, however, still 
deals with objects relative to purposes and points of view.   
When the objectivity of the object becomes the focus of thought, then 
measurement and arithmetic set the object apart—to metrein kai arithmein kai 
istanai—in order to more fully reach objective qualities (38). At this point, we leave 
the level of pistis and progress to dianoia. Thus the object becomes amenable to 
mathesis, that is, it can be taught and learned according to its mathemata rather than 
only experienced according to its pathemata. By postulating an object set apart from 
the subjective experience of it, these measurable and calculable qualities allow for the 
possibility of affirmation and denial; for the judgements of truth and falsity; and for 
those of reality and unreality. 
Pistis segues into dianoia, with the experiential counters of actual entities in 
our ordinary world of sense-perception being exchanged for intellectual, empirically 
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abstracted concepts derived from pistic experience to enable the level of thought 
specific to dianoia. To experience the entities of pistis as actual objective entities as 
such, in distinction from the presentations in eikasia, wherein the objective actuality 
or not of something corresponding to the presentation is not considered, requires a 
degree of thought which is then refined in dianoia. 
 
Dianoia 
The genealogy of dianoia is apparent not only from pistis but also from 
aisthesis/eikasia. Dianoia is a way of thinking and knowing that has been built up 
from earlier stages. Following the Divided Line thus far from ingenuous, imagistic 
consciousness of shadows, reflections, and other, e.g. painted, images towards higher 
mathematical reasoning and ergon logistikou, (39) or rational power, then towards the 
dialectical approach to Ideas, we see an epistemological theory of consciousness that 
is built up developmentally from the ground of sensation. The stages in Plato’s 
epistemological model progress along a similar path to that taken in Jean Piaget’s 
constructivist model of genetic epistemology, which shows children developing from 
mastery of sensorimotor operations and concrete intelligence to representational and 
conceptual thought. However, Plato’s epistemology, while the main focus in Socrates’ 
telling of the Divided Line to Glaucon1, is secondary to Plato’s ontology, which 
moves in the other direction: beginning with the Ideas and the Form of the Good and 
ending in reflections, shadows and other images. 
This is because Socrates and Glaucon are discussing the best methods of education, so 
the attainment of knowledge is here the foremost topic. 
Following the divided line epistemologically, moving from naïve consciousness to 
127 
 
empirico-scientific and mathematical thinking, everything seems to be built up from 
the empirical ground of sense-perception and its appearances, which are omnipresent 
and dominant in eikasia. Thus far, it appears that Plato has no skyhooks descend. Thus 
far, that is to say, this epistemological model is being built from the ground up, from 
sense-perception, though the kind of ‘common-sense’, conventional, ‘animal faith’ 
use of beliefs and opinions, to conceptual and mathematical thinking in dianoia, 
before the movement toward the Forms and the Form of the Good in noesis. There is 
no chance of a mystical access to Ideas with a capital 'I' from some secret world 
behind the scenes.   
As in the analogy of the prisoners in the cave, which immediately follows the 
Divided Line passage, the way to the Ideas is difficult ascent after being released from 
the chains which compelled the prisoners to watch only shadows on the cave wall and 
hear only distorted echoes. After the release from the chains, the freed prisoner makes 
slow epistemological progress, first able only to observe shadows and dark colours, 
then brighter colours on the objects themselves, until the fire itself in the cave can be 
observed, showing the way of the path up to the cave’s exit. Here again, the freed man 
moves from shadows, to dark colours, to bright objects, to the source of all light, the 
sun. For Plato, the philosopher may contemplate the Forms and the Form of the Good 
only after a long process ascending through necessary stages. The chained prisoners 
cannot reach the Forms by some lucky guess extrapolating from the shadows and 
echoes that constitute their world. As was argued in the Theaetetus, any lucky 
conjecture would be no more than that, rather than knowledge, for it could not be 
known as such by being differentiated from any other conjecture. True belief, and 
even true belief backed up with a likely story, is not knowledge. 
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Plato showed that before knowledge is reached, we much first work our way 
from the phantasia of imagery in eikasia to the confidence of everyday dealings in 
pistis. From here, the first step to knowledge can be made, when we can think through 
problems with concepts and mathematical forms in dianoia. Dianoia is literally 
thinking through, but instead of thinking directly with the Forms, it has uses the 
images and diagrams given by representational concepts and geometry. Hence, 
dianoia is a form of episteme, but remains a shadow of noesis. Coleridge retains this 
slow build-up towards knowledge in his model, working up out thinking from Sense 
and Fancy, through the Higher and Lower Understandings, until Reason, the 
counterpart of noesis, is reached.   
When it comes to achieving self-conscious Reason, Coleridge was as 
cautious as Plato, saying that the progress is one of slow ascent with necessary 
processes along the way. However, Coleridge added a Romantic twist. Coleridge often 
mentioned his distaste for overly clear distinctions that seem to have been made 
merely in order to divide what is not essentially in division. A clear-cut series of 
divisions creating a faculty psychology was not to Coleridge’s taste. Coleridge 
presented a dynamic model emphasizing the “each-in-all” aspect of the “faculties” 
such that there is Sense in Reason and Reason in Sense, with traces of Fancy, 
Understanding, and Imagination running through. Whether a particular instance of 
thought is to be considered Understanding or Imagination depends on what aspects 
are conscious and what remain unselfconscious. In this way, Coleridge made room for 
the Romantic notion of a Romantic presentiment of mystery and Beauty, of Truth and 
the Forms, that was accessible, but not as self-conscious knowledge, at the lowest 
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levels of sensory and aesthetic experience. 
Plato is often thought of as being an idealist. He is often misrepresented as 
arguing that matter is an illusion, and that the everyday concrete objects we deal with 
are merely shadows cast by the Forms. This misinterpretation comes from a shallow 
reading of the Allegory of the Prisoners in the Cave, and other passages in the 
dialogues. The understanding of things in the states of doxa (eikasia and pistis) is 
indeed ‘shadowy’, which is to say lightweight and insufficient, but the objects of the 
opinions and beliefs are not always mere shadows (although they are sometimes, 
literally shadows), they are indeed material objects (or their images, which include 
shadows).   
In the Timaeus, Plato describes the demiurge as using the Forms as models to 
create an ordered world out of the chaos of matter that preceded the cosmos, the 
ordered world. Although in this creation myth, a creation or order, not a creation ex 
nihilo, the demiurge employs the Forms of the Platonic solids, built up from triangles, 
to order the world, the matter thus ordered was already in existence. The same matter 
exists before and after the ordering. The Platonic point that is often confused is that 
the objects of sense-experience are material, but because they are transient, 
ever-transforming, and always coming-to-be and passing-away, they can be 
understood to be less real than the laws and Ideas responsible for their essential 
patterns and appearances.   
Think of a small eddy in a river. It is fascinating to observe, perhaps calming 
even. Imagine a naïve someone who finds it so alluring, so beautiful, that they want to 
take it home. They try to catch the eddy in a bucket and are disappointed when in the 
bucket all they seem to have caught is still water, while the eddy remains swirling just 
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downstream of the rock in the river. Of course the eddy is a material phenomenon, 
manifested only in material fluids. But the actual matter that happens to be doing the 
manifesting is something quite interchangeable and inessential. To really know the 
eddy, the observer needs to appreciate, first by induction, through observation, the 
commonalities in all such patterns in liquids and gasses. From this the essential 
features can be separated from the interchangeable. Observations, conjectures, 
experiment, concept-building all work together until what one is really thinking of are 
no longer particular instances. What one begins to think about in essentially knowing 
the eddy are not less-vivacious sense-impressions called memories, nor 
“hieroglyphic” images working as conceptual counters.  
Knowing the eddy eventually amounts to knowing the bodiless, invisible, 
laws or principles, what Plato called the Forms, which obtain even when the material 
is not there to instantiate the laws. This amounts to, as Coleridge argued, 
understanding that the laws responsible for phenomena are not themselves phenomena.  
Plato just argued that these laws, or Forms, are to be thought of as more real than the 
phenomena. To understand this way of talking is to focus on the thought that the 
eddy’s being has more to do with the laws governing how fluids behave when a solid 
partially interrupts the flow, than with the particular matter that instantiates the eddy 
phenomenon at any one time. The eddy is a possibility the laws of which always exist, 
or perhaps better, obtain, even if the phenomenon is, at any time, not being 
instantiated at a particular place. What accounts for this eternal factor, the ‘always’ in 
the possibility of the appearance’s coming-to-be, is the set of laws or principles that 
account for (epistemologically) and are logically and chronologically prior to and 
responsible for (ontologically) the phenomenon. 
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A ground-up reading of Plato’s Divided Line, as epistemological progression, 
understands ‘ground’ as the starting position of the experiencing subject commencing 
the journey to knowledge (episteme) from interconnected imagery (eikasia).  
‘Ground’ in this context cannot mean something foundational, that is to say logically 
originary, in Plato’s theory, because the originaries, or archai, are the Ideas or Forms 
themselves, which are the starting point when the Divided Line is read in the other 
direction, ontologically. 
The epistemological reading, which is the way Plato primarily intended the 
Line to be read, given the context in the discussion on education, describes the path to 
knowledge by perceiving subjects who have the ability to reason. The epistemological 
ground-up reading retains sense-perception, belief, an opinion as early stages, but 
proceeds from them and beyond them. This is what Coleridge also does when he 
retains the theory, but not the conclusions, of the mechanists and associationists (such 
as Hartley and Locke) within his broader scheme. As Plato saw sense-perception and 
opinion as gathering a store of images and recognizable objects and patterns which are 
then able to be operated on, by deduction and abstraction, into mathematizable 
concepts that can be processed in the absence of their phenomenal manifestations, so 
Coleridge acknowledged the place of the empirico-associationist account of sense 
experience being built up from the ground of experience through sense awareness.   
The mechanisms of sense-perception and association were not disputed by 
Coleridge, but were retained as the mechanisms of Sense and Fancy, the pre-rational 
process of re-arranging impressions which can be then worked into concepts, allowing 
for thought processes about general events and object-kinds in the absence of both the 
phenomena and the memories of the phenomena. Up to this point in the essentially 
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parallel schemes of Plato and Coleridge, there is nothing major that Protagoras and 
Theaetetus (representing the relativism of Plato’s day, along with the (empiricist) 
thesis that knowledge is nothing more than sense-perception, the main thesis shown to 
collapse into aporia in the Theaetetus) or Locke and Hartley would contest. 
Coleridge’s system was synoptic. In a sense he was a traditionalist and a 
hoarder, loathing to abandon what has been and still can be seen to be useful. In his 
twinned essays on Bentham and Coleridge, Mill asserted that these were the “two 
great seminal minds of England in their age” (40). Mill continued, ‘Bentham was a 
Progressive philosopher, Coleridge a Conservative one. . . . To Bentham it was given 
to discern more particularly those truths with which existing doctrines and institutions 
were at variance; to Coleridge, the neglected truths which lay in them’ (41).  Mill 
saw that Bentham, regarding ancient or received opinion, would always ask, Is it true? 
but Coleridge, What is the meaning of it? Where the one would call for the extinction 
of the old institutions, the other would aim for their realization, ‘reasserting the best 
meaning and purposes of the old.’ This appraisal by his later contemporary would 
have appealed to Coleridge.  ‘I regard truth as a divine ventriloquist’, he wrote in 
Biographia Literaria, ‘I care not from whose mouth the sounds are supposed to 
proceed, if only the words are audible and intelligible’ (42). 
With his synoptic system, Coleridge could retain the empirico-associationist 
mechanisms as explanations of how memories come to be; how concepts can be 
initially shaped as abstractions; and how fancy in poetic and other works, and in 
fevered brains, can come about. This level of explanation could be retained from the 
level of Sense to the concepts in the Understanding without needing to retain such 
conclusions as Hume’s that aesthetic and moral values are nothing more than 
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projections of pleasurable and painful sensations; that knowledge is nothing more 
than sense-perception or generalizations therefrom; or, stretching back to Aristotle, 
that there is nothing in the mind that was not first in the senses, which dictum 
Coleridge could only accept with Leibniz’s addition, ‘…save for the mind itself.’ 
Coleridge argued that the presence to the lower understanding, which 
occupies a similar position and has a similar functional role to Plato's pistis, of reason 
in its negative aspect is the first stage in the awakening of reason in the self-conscious 
human mind.  Prior to this, reason is present, but we are not present to it insofar as 
we are not aware of it as such. The universal applicability of reason in its negative 
aspect as the law of contradiction impresses the mind with the force of reason, both 
formal and applied. The point is that the law of contradiction is understood as being 
neither inductively derived from experience, nor formulated from concepts abstracted 
from sense-perception, and yet it is universally applicable. Coleridge argues that a 
mind’s being impressed with this logical, universal applicability that is not derived 
from experience constitutes a dawning moment when the lights come on. This is the 
moment the understanding ceases to be mere understanding. Coleridge argued that 
reason slowly awakens in us, negatively at first, an appreciation of reason’s scope and 
force; on the other side the empiricists argued that not only a conceptual armoury but 
also the logical techniques of wielding it are fashioned and evolved out of 
sense-perception and its traces. 
With a neo-Platonically inspired poetic description, Coleridge described the 
presence of awakening reason as “the downshine of reason”, suggesting the 
neo-Platonic doctrine of emanation from the One towards the appearances of matter.  
Although Coleridge appreciated Plotinus’ doctrine as poetry, he saw it as a noble 
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failure philosophically, which is how he described it in Aids to Reflection, so I do not 
think that Coleridge intended this 'downshine' to be taken in a literal, neo-Platonic 
sense of Nous emanating from the One to irradiate with order chaotic matter. It seems 
likely that by it he intended to describe something akin to Schelling's principle that 
“Mind is invisible nature; nature visible mind” (Natürphilosophie). In this sense, “the 
downshine of reason” would suggest the view that reason is not just something that 
conscious subjects have access to through thought, but that it is the rational order of 
the universe and the ground of all laws and truths. 
A recurrent theme in Coleridge is that natural laws have an ideal (Platonic, 
not subjective) nature. Laws of nature account for phenomena, without themselves 
being phenomena. As such, they lie behind, as it were, phenomena, being prior to 
them in the order of thought rather than appearances. Laws as things real, like 
gravitation, yet obviously not phenomenal, like actual apples, can help argue to the 
mind of empirical, scientific bent the reality of a fundamental order of being that is 
not phenomenal, thus not graspable within the empiricist's net. For Coleridge, this 
opened the door on the natural, physical side for natural laws to be understood 
Platonically, intellectually, as real and effective ideals. Indeed, Coleridge pointed out 
that Plato sometimes referred to Ideas as ‘living laws’ and that Francis Bacon, in The 
New Organon, sometimes described his notion of natural laws as ‘living Ideas’ and as 
‘Forms’. 
Returning to my example of the eddy, when the observer notices general 
effects, such as warm and cold water eddies swirling in opposite directions depending 
on the location in the North or South hemispheres, the classification of evidence, the 
application of concepts, and the generation of theories remains within the sphere of 
135 
 
dianoia, or for Coleridge, the higher Understanding. When the thinker stops taking the 
axioms and concepts for granted, and inquires into their logical foundations, then the 
dialectical movement to episteme begins.   
Plato’s first example of a science exemplifying dianoia is geometry (43).  
Geometers employ hypotheses, which are then assumed, rather than being 
investigated themselves, after all, the hypotheses of geometry cannot be used to 
investigate the hypotheses of geometry. Plato’s other examples of the sciences in 
dianoia are arithmetic, and harmonic theory (music, necessary for developing reason, 
grace and discernment (44)), and astronomy. These are not exhaustive, and Plotinus 
added, by way of example, architecture and carpentry.  Dianoia creates technical 
subjects, treating of its various subject matters with abstracted concepts and visual 
aids, taken from the objects in pistis, that are to be understood in terms of number, 
space, and time. Arithmetic, geometry, and music are therefore taken to be the highest 
sciences in dianoia, alongside astronomy, which studies number in space and time. 
Dialectic takes the study a stage further, working not from hypotheses, but a priori, 
towards the Forms themselves and their first principle, the Form of the Good.   
Dianoia works downwards, from hypotheses and unexplored assumptions, 
which are taken for granted, towards conclusions. Dianoia’s strength is that it is 
deductive, but its weakness is that most of its premises are unexamined assumptions, 
such as ‘the odd and the even, the various figures, the three kinds of angles’ (45).  
Moreover, although dianoia aims at the Forms, it is constrained to use visible 
diagrams. ‘These figures that they make and draw, of which shadows and reflections 
in water are images, they now in turn use as images, in seeking to see those others 
themselves that one cannot see except by means of thought’ (46).   
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Dianoia is, then, akin to eikasia, but at a higher level, in its reliance on 
images.  Dianoia does not travel upwards from its hypotheses to examine, and thus 
really know, its first principles. It is thus incapable of reaching beyond its hypotheses.  
Hence, those thinking while they are in dianoia, ‘have some apprehension of true 
being––geometry and the like––they only dream about being, but never can they 
behold the waking reality so long as they leave the hypotheses which they use 
unexamined, and are unable to give an account of them’ (47). A difficulty in this 
presentation, of which Plato was fully aware, is that the Simile of the Divided Line is 
but a conceptual model and as such, it is an example of dianoia, with its respective 
insufficiencies. At the beginning of the Divided Line passage, Socrates says that he is 
aware that in the following, ‘I am omitting a great deal’ (48). In practice, the Divided 
Line is a pedagogical model that uses the image-making and manipulating capacities 
of dianoia to begin to explain the four major epistemological faculties.     
Kenneth Dorter presented a good case that for Plato, the Divided Line was a 
‘disappearing ladder” that “vanishes as soon as we try to grasp hold of it’ (49). 
Dorter’s argument is that Plato was well aware of the shortcomings of trying to 
present a conceptual image of an idea that aims to point out the limitations of models, 
abstracted concepts and images. Indeed, just before the Divided Line model is 
described, Socrates asserts that what follows is more like his best opinion, rather than 
a conveyance of knowledge. The method of using poetic description (as in the chariot 
myth of the soul in the Phaedrus, or the ladder of love in the Symposium) or of 
conceptual models (as in the Divided Line) to point towards, rather than fully 
explicate, positions that are held to be praeter-conceptual is a method that led authors 
such as R.M. Hare and Mary Ann Perkins to write about two Platos, or ‘The Other 
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Plato.”   
However, we do not need to attribute a split personality to Plato if we 
recognize Plato’s models and poetic descriptions as following the arguments to where 
the concepts of dianoia alone cannot progress. The opening words of The Republic, ‘I 
went down to Piraeus’, has been traditionally interpreted as focusing our attention on 
the phrase ‘I went down’, alluding to Socrates returning descent from noesis, through 
dianoia, pistis and eikasia, back to the prisoners in the cave, to try to teach from his 
perspective in a way that can be understood in the lower epistemic and imaginative 
levels, all the while educing a desire in the audience to make the ascent for themselves.  
As much the Sun cannot be properly described to lifelong prisoners chained to stare at 
shadows and hear echoes, true knowledge, and its perspective, cannot be described to 
the student in its own terms; Socrates, in this role, has to use the tools of eikasia, pistis 
and dianoia to indicate a truth and perspective beyond those levels. It is fitting that 
this descent back into the cave is made in The Republic, a political work primarily on 
Justice, one of the main theses of which is that the philosopher, even though inclined 
to remain in an ivory tower, detached from the political main in order to contemplate 
the Forms, has a duty to “go down” and teach, that is to say to educate––draw out–– 
the inhabitants of the cave of puppets and shadows. 
 
Noesis 
As dianoia was described as moving down from its hypotheses and 
assumptions towards conclusions, noesis begins from the same hypotheses but moves 
upwards, towards the first principles, through the Forms and ultimately to the 
principle of the unity of the Forms, the Form of the Good. The important point here, 
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concerning knowledge, is that noesis is not satisfied with taking any concept, diagram 
or hypothesis for granted just because it is practically useful. Noesis is a search 
towards the first principles. From this point, noesis is in a position to do two things.  
 Firstly, and Plato argues this is the most attractive option to the philosopher, 
at the point of noesis the thinker is in a position to contemplate the Forms and to 
contemplate their unity as a kind of architectonic of Reason finding their necessary 
principle of unity in the Form of the Good. Because of the attractiveness of this 
apparently disinterested position, the philosopher must be compelled to descend from 
the beatific vision to the preceding levels in order to educate and to share insights with 
others. As Plato has Socrates say, ‘Moreover, I said, you must not wonder that those 
who attain to this beatific vision are unwilling to descend to human affairs; for their 
souls are ever hastening into the upper world where they desire to dwell; which desire 
of theirs is very natural, if our allegory may be trusted’ (50). Although the philosopher 
described in the Republic needs to be compelled to descend from contemplation of the 
Forms and the Good, this should not be a difficult task, seeing as the desire of the 
philosopher in noesis is concentrated on virtue as application of the principles of 
Good, and therefore the general good is intended as a goal, and not merely the 
self-interested aesthetic enjoyment of contemplation. 
Secondly, the thinker at the stage of noesis is in a position to return from and 
via the first principles to interpret and educate those in the stages of dianoia, pistis, 
and eikasia. Much of this work must be allegorical in nature, because dianoia, pistis, 
or eikasia, in their own terms alone, and take strictly literally, cannot advance beyond 
their own spheres. The limits of their languages are indeed the limits of their worlds.  
If concepts go in, concepts come out; and the same goes for beliefs, conjectures, and 
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images. The Socratic method of dialectic must therefore proceed by showing the seeds 
of contradiction already lying within each of the epistemic and doxastic levels 
preceding noesis, which levels depend upon sensory images, empirical evidence, 
experience of everyday dealings, but not on what Plato takes to be the eternal truths.  
While dianoia has access to the Forms, taken, perhaps indirectly, as mathematicals, 
these are not understood with reference to first principles, but are hypotheses and 
assumptions demonstrated to have powerful practical application. 
The most usual demonstration of noesis in Plato comes indeed in the form of 
Socrates’ dialectical method. The participants typically begin by trying to pin down 
the meaning of a single term, usually a value or a virtue, such as courage, piety, 
beauty, friendship, knowledge, and proceed by illustrations, questions, answers and 
cross-examination until the original definitions and assumptions are found to be 
self-contradictory. Socrates then, as in the earlier dialogues, leaves the audience aware 
of their ignorance, with the aporia now glaringly and dumbfoundingly apparent, but 
perhaps now with an enlivened desire to know. In the middle and later dialogues, this 
model continues to advance by a series of tacks, pushing against contradictions and 
drawing towards necessities. On this path, the movement is to follow the argument 
wherever it will lead. 
So Plato describes two modes noesis: one of contemplation of the Forms, the 
other as the procedure of dialectic intended to reveal aporia, foster genuine 
intellectual curiosity, and to move by theses and antitheses toward ever finer 
definitions until first principles may be reached. The second, dialectical mode is 
primarily governed by the law of contradiction as way of showing the aporia in 
assumptions and arguments as being self-evident. Invariably, Socrates’ procedure 
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appears as ironic, as if he is speaking in one realm, say that of pistis, while thinking in 
another, noesis. He often needs recourse to parables, similes, analogy and symbol in 
order to convey the noetic insight that cannot be described in the terms and counters 
of eikasia, pistis, or dianoia.  Socrates must keep one eye, as it were, on the object of 
noesis, and another on the development of thought among those in the discussion. 
Naturally enough, Plato describes noesis as the “eye of the soul” with its own objects, 
the Forms, appropriate to its own methods of apprehension (51). The Form of the 
Good is held to “enlighten” the soul, and this “eye of the mind” is held to be 
“sun-like”, and those who have reached the goal ‘fix their gaze on that which sheds 
light on all’ (52). In his 1810 introduction to his Theory of Colours, Goethe wrote, 
following Plato: ‘If the eye were not sun-like, it could not see the sun; if we did not 
carry within us the very power of God, how could anything God-like delight us?’ This 
notion of a part, or function, of the soul itself resembling the fundamental principles, 
or Forms, held an appeal to the Romantics, for whom the Kantian critiques held a 
hope for belief in a noumenal reality, but also disappointed in barring all access to this 
reality for any creature whose knowledge can only be of phenomena and the projected 
categories necessary for intuition. Just as the ocular eye must be somehow sun-like if 
it is to see, Reason must be Form-like, and resemble the Good, the argument goes, if it 
is to contemplate in noesis.2 
So Plato described at least two modes of noesis, corresponding to what 
Coleridge would call Reason. There is the mode of dialectic, moving through 
examining theses in dialogue, upwards from hypotheses and aiming toward the first 
principles, or the arche. The second, exalted, mode of noesis is the contemplation of 
the Forms. This mode dies not lend itself well to verbal description, and has indeed 
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been described by Plato and the neo-Platonists as ultimately ineffable. Perhaps for this 
reason more than any other, Plato had recourse to simile, metaphor, analogy, and most 
of the poetical devices and flourishes to be found in the Platonic dialogues. There are 
two places in Plato where I think he expressed most clearly the ineffability of this 
contemplative mode of noesis, and both are in the Republic.   
At 533a, at the very end of the discussion of the Divided Line, Socrates tells 
Plato’s brother Glaucon,  
“You will not be able, dear Glaucon, to follow me further, though on my part 
there will be no lack of goodwill. And, if I could, I would show you, no longer an 
image and symbol of my meaning, but the very truth, as it appears to me—though 
whether rightly or not I may not properly affirm. But that something like this is what 
we have to see, I must affirm. Is not that so?”  “Surely.”  “And may we not also 
declare that nothing less than the power of dialectics could reveal this, and that only to 
one experienced in the studies we have described, and that the thing is in no other 
wise possible?”  “That, too,” he said,  “we may properly affirm.”  “This, at any 
rate,” said I, “no one will maintain in dispute against us.”  
Basically, Socrates is given to say that the highest level of noesis, the 
end-point of dialectic, is beyond what can be put into words, and can only be 
demonstrated by being induced through dialectic.   
The second place where Plato affirms the ultimate ineffability of the 
contemplation of forms, indeed of the very principle of the Forms, is when he makes 
perhaps the deepest single statement in the Platonic corpus, in his description of the 
Form of the Good. At 509d10, Socrates asserts that, ‘…the Good is not being but 
superior to and beyond being in dignity and power.’ The Good, for Plato the Form of 
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Forms, is ideal in nature. It is not an existent being, but its reality is known through its 
power. What is this power? There is a clue in a later dialogue, the Sophist, wherein the 
visiting Stranger (Xenon, Greek for ‘stranger’) is debating with the materialist 
Theaetetus, a bright young student of Mathematics and other higher studies, about 
materialism and anti-materialism. Xenon, championing an anti-materialist cause, 
proposes that he must only get his opponents to admit the reality of any ‘entity’, no 
matter how trivial, that is bodiless, in order to defeat the hard materialist position that 
the only things which exist are bodies (somata). ‘If they can concede that there is 
something or other, even a trifle, which we can characterize as asomata, then that is 
already enough’ (53). Here Xenon invites discussion about what it is to be, and the 
notion that whatever is must have a power to effect, that is to say, a causal influence, 
is accepted. He argues that bodiless forms such as Justice, and their contraries, such as 
injustice, turn out to be powers, real movers, even though ideal, whether adjectival or 
substantial. Justice, wisdom, ‘and the soul in which they come into being’ are real 
things which are themselves neither visible nor touchable. This clue from the Sophist 
shows Plato arguing that power is to be understood as a causal influence, and so we 
can argue that for Plato, the power of the Good which surpasses being can be seen as 
an ideal, the contemplation of which has a pre-eminent power to influence Reason, 
and hence choice, behaviour and ethical consideration. Of course, for Plato, the power 
surpassing being held by the Form of the Good is even greater than this, which 
depends on rational contemplation to stimulate ontological and ethical consideration; 
beyond this, Plato argued that the Forms themselves, and hence the law-like 
behaviour of the universe, are ultimately derived from the Form of the Good. The 
actual matter of the universe is not derived from this Form of Forms, as Plato 
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proposed in the Timaeus, but the intelligible order of the structures, functions and 
laws by which this matter is anything knowable at all, rather than just chaos, is owed 
to the Form of the Good. 
Aristotle mentions Plato’s method of the 2-stage argument, firstly towards 
first principles (arche), away, as it were, from the natural (actual) order (the 
epistemological direction of the Divided Line), which is analysis, a term used 
metaphorically and taken from geometry, and then from theses to first principles, to 
reconstitute the “natural” order, a process of synthesis. The neo-Platonists took this 
movement of synthesis as describing the emanation from the One, to the three 
hypostases of Being. Coleridge’s admired this very literal notion of emanation, 
although he saw it ultimately as a grand failure, in which no others have fallen from 
so high, so ambitiously. 
Exploring the differing models of Plato’s Divided Line and Coleridge’s 
harmonic polarity provides a schema for appreciating how Coleridge Romanticized 
Platonism. The assimilation of Platonism to Romanticism required certain changes to 
allow a modified Platonism to fit well with the Romantic program. In Coleridge’s 
scheme, the place of eikasia is given to Sense and then Fancy. Plato’s eikasia has 
often been translated as ‘imagination’ (54), and Plato accorded it the lowest position, 
representing an insubstantial, illusory ‘shadow-world’ that was a state of virtual 
ignorance. While Coleridge placed Fancy at this level, he placed Imagination proper 
on the other side of the polarity, which in Plato would be the side of episteme.  
Coleridge placed Imagination above the higher Understanding and below Reason.  
Thus Imagination, for Coleridge, becomes that art necessary for episteme, that is for 
drawing down, or drawing to, Reason and its Ideas. Imagination’s symbols and 
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schemata allow access, in Coleridge’s Romantic modification to the Platonic scheme, 
to Ideas that remain inaccessible to the Understanding alone. 
 
Fancy, in the lower pole, is mimetic, aping shape and other properties 
accessible to Sense. It alters by association, addition, subtraction, contiguity, similarity, 
inversion, and other basic operations that can be supported by the mechanical model.  
On the other hand, the Coleridgean Imagination is never simply productive of external 
shaping processes. That is to say, it does not merely copy and process. The products of 
Imagination aim towards an internal resemblance of their objects. In fact, Coleridge 
expresses this in stronger terms, saying, “the living educts of the imagination; of that 
reconciling and mediatory power, which incorporating the Reason in Images of the 
Sense, and organizing (as it were) the flux of the Senses by the permanence and 
self-circling energies of the Reason, gives birth to a system of symbols, harmonious in 
themselves, and con-substantial with the truths, of which they are the conductors” 
(55). 
‘Consubstantial’ is the stronger term Coleridge used here. By being 
consubstantial, Coleridge means that Imagination, ‘always partakes of the Reality 
which it renders intelligible; and while it enunciates the whole, abides itself as a living 
part in the Unity, of which it is the representative’ (56). 
This higher role of Imagination beyond the capacity to have representations 
(as perceptions, memories, mental images) based on what are taken to be external 
resemblances, and beyond the facility to create representations (such painted likeness, 
or written prosaic -or fanciful- descriptions -or recombined descriptions) is a 
departure from the Platonic scheme. I propose that this departure was a major 
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contribution to the formulation of a Romantic philosophy. In this sense, Romanticism 
is a modified Platonism. One might wish to call it a neo-Platonism, were that term not 
already taken to describe the philosophers in late Antiquity from Ammonius Saccas, 
Plotinus and Porphyry through to Damascius (the last scolarch of the School of 
Athens when the emperor Justinian I destroyed the school in his persecution of the 
neo-Platonists) and his student Simplicius. 
The neo-Platonists were, however, an actual influence on the creation of 
Romanticism as a modification of Platonism. In ‘On Intelligible Beauty’, Plotinus 
makes some remarks that could be interpreted as gentle criticisms of Plato’s position 
on art as mimesis, which criticisms constitute a departure from Plato (57). Elsewhere 
in the Enneads Plotinus raises no objections to the doctrine of representation as 
mimesis, and even endorses the view. In Ennead, V 9.1, Plotinus classifies the arts 
and here asserts that painting, sculpture, dancing, and mime are all, and not only the 
latter, mimetikai, or mimetic, because they are based on models from sense experience.  
Music is contrasted against these arts as higher in origin because its model is not a 
sensible but rather the symmetry and order of the intelligibles. With music, perhaps 
surprisingly, Plotinus ranks also architecture and carpentry, because their use of 
necessary proportions connects them, without the intermediary of a sensible model, 
with Ideal principles, especially those of Geometry. The deductively provable axioms 
of Geometry are, of course, almost emblematically typical examples of what Plato 
considered as knowledge, episteme rather than doxa.   
Plotinus’ ranking music, architecture and carpentry as higher arts that model 
at least the mathematika (for example the axioms of Geometry) and hence rank as 
genuine knowledge, as opposed to painting, sculpture, dance, and mime does not 
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contradict anything in Plato. Although in the Divided Line Plato places painting in the 
category of eikasia, along with natural images such as shadows and reflections, he 
does not mention anything of music, architecture or carpentry in this passage.  
Nevertheless, on the argument that these arts derive from use of the mathematicals, 
we can see how they can be placed along the Divided Line as an application of 
dianoia. On the same theme, but now much later in The Republic, in Book X, Plato 
compares the bed of the carpenter with that of the painter, and it is almost certainly 
this that Plotinus has in mind when he ranks carpentry as a higher art, next to music.  
Famously, Plato argued that while painter is two removes from the arche, or original, 
of the bed, the carpenter’s bed, which is the model for the painter is only one remove 
from the Idea of the bed. Although Plato talks of the bed made by God, which is a 
Form (the Bed), and the bed of the carpenter (a bed), it seems to me unlikely that 
Plato really means that there is a Form of the bed, or of other artefacts. I think this for 
reasons that I will explain elsewhere, sufficing to say for now that I take the passage 
on The Bed to be a didactic analogy to explain the difference between originals and 
imitations, so that Socrates can explain his argument for the exclusion of poetry.3  
This is an argument that the Romantics, especially Coleridge, would obviously wish 
to modify, and Plotinus’ modification would allow poetry, as itself using music, to 
have the status of dianoia, and not merely eikasia (which it would still also have, 
insofar as it was sensibly representational).  
In Coleridge’s system, Sense (aisthesis in Plato) harmonizes with Reason 
(noesis). Although Plato’s Divided Line is dynamic, and may be read in both 
directions (starting from images to read epistemologically, and starting from Ideas to 
read ontologically), Coleridge’s model adds the further dynamic tension of polarity.  
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This is what brings out harmonies along the pole. Hence Coleridge shows how Sense 
rhymes, as it were, with Reason. Sense itself cannot be mistaken, although opinions 
(doxa) about it can be. Sense and Reason have an intuitive immediacy that is absent 
from the levels in between.   
Configuring the line as a polarity, Coleridge dignified Sense by bringing out 
its affinities with Reason. This move is a significant move in Romanticizing Plato.  
With this polar harmony, Reason can be seen as more like its polar counterpart, Sense, 
and less similar to Understanding, despite Understanding being a nearer neighbour. 
Coleridge’s tweaking of Plato’s Divided Line into a harmonic polarity also 
brings out some lines of speculative inquiry that appeal to the Romantic imagination.  
If Reason is more present, although somnambulant, in Sense than in Understanding, 
we might ask if some Ideas can be intuitively felt in aesthetic experience, in aisthesis.  
Could this provide a way of framing how, for example, moral qualities can be felt 
almost palpably?   
When Socrates turned philosophy’s questioning to Ethics, was he creating 
Ethics? As the initiation of well-formed questions regarding the Good, yes, he was.  
Although dialectic is the best way to proceed to the Forms, there are other ways: 
prophecy; divine madness; love; contemplation of Beauty. Dialectic is the best, 
because its method is transparent, demanding rational assent along every step of the 
way. Aesthetic ascent demands assent too, but the ‘yes’ of pleasure is not the ‘yes’ of 
reason. But what is the difference?   
One will only grant assent to pleasure if that pleasure is felt. Equally, 
however, one will also only honestly give assent to reason if that reason is understood.  
Don't they both demand their own kinds of pathemata, of subjective experience? 
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A Platonic response to that question could be that reason does not provide 
pathemata, only noemata. Here we have a spanner in the works that prevents a 
smooth transition for Coleridge to polarize Plato's Divided Line. Ideas are not 
sensations, and this really is an obstruction that accounts for a main and necessary 
difference between Romanticism and Platonism. For the Romantics, deep feelings 
could be united with profound thoughts. Of course, there is even a clue in the choice 
of the word “profound”, because the word “transcendent” could equally well have 
been used here, also connoting extremity, but in the opposite direction. For Plato, 
poetry, and heightened states of feeling can also ascend to the heights, as it were, as 
thought can, but they are of a lower value they are a kind of lucky trick, a gift from 
the gods, and not constituted by the effort of ones own reason. 
We can imagine what Plato was doing and exemplifying by his use of poetic 
descriptions. But was the poetry Plato's way of gesturing to, with symbols that use the 
sensible, what he had already encountered in more pure form, with noesis alone? Or 
were the poetic flights as useful for Plato's ascent as he intended them to be useful for 
his students and readership? Poetry, love, madness, and prophesy can also ascend to 
the Forms, as Plato had Socrates argue in the Phaedrus. But they retain a sensuality, a 
lower soul, as he put it, (spirit and appetite, but not nous, reason) attachment to 
sensation. Their ascent is not the purest, non-imagistic dialectic. 
Can people be good without being rationally so? To help illustrate the 
question with a setting, Kant would have answered it in the negative. For Kant, only a 
rational being can be ethical, because only a rational being can be free from the sway 
of sensuality and choose its own law, the moral law that is demonstrably 
non-contradictory if universalized. Hence only a rational being can have autonomy. 
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Could there be a dialectic of the heart? Or, of the lower soul, the spirit and the 
appetite? If so, could its dynamic be anything other than the heteronymous use of 
sensation by reason? The heart does not announce its reasoning step by step with 
logically connected propositions. But then why should it? It is not the mind.  
Inasmuch as the mind may look down on the heart's apparent naivety, it cannot look 
down on its contradictions, because only propositions can contradict one another.  
And besides, the heart could just as well feel the mind's impotence and irrelevance to 
the experienced situation as the mind deduces the heart's seemingly incommensurable 
methods of finding the truth. 
The Romanticization of Plato, remembering that Romanticism is itself a 
descendent of Platonism, is therefore a call to try to listen to both sides at once. The 
Ideal is not being renounced as illusory, merely metaphysical, creations to be 
committed to the flames in favour of the purely phenomenal, as the empiricists 
championed. The Romantic position of the Ideal remains unmoved, but it becomes 
relatively changed as Coleridge claims powerful polar status for the aesthetic 
extremes Plato knew as aisthesis and eikasia. Coleridge even moved Plato's phantasia, 
imagination, a great part of eikasia, way beyond the median point and up beyond 
dianoia, or the higher understanding, to become Reason's nearest neighbour and 
handmaiden. 
Disgust, aversion, revulsion, as well as admiration, are impressions that have 
an intuitively moral feel to them. However defeasible these experiences are, moral 
qualities in people’s characters tend to be experienced as things felt. A person can be 
experienced as creepy, slimy (as Sartre analyzed), shifty, chilling, as well as firm, 
dependable, and warm. Indeed, in the experience of feeling, correctly or not, these 
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qualities are taken as directly as perceiving someone as tall, blond, and loud. 
Coleridge’s Romanticizing the Divided Line into a harmonic polarity 
provides a schema that expands Plato’s model to accommodate some of Plato’s own 
views on beauty. The divine madness that Plato describes in Symposium and Phaedrus 
is a state in which one “intuits Beauty itself” (58), inspired to this vision by the 
attraction felt towards the appearance of a beautiful person. 
The harmony between Reason and Sense can also be recognized when we 
reflect that the intuitions of aisthesis are direct, because the objects are immediate.  
The red patch I intuit in Sense is precisely as it appears, no more and no less.  
Whether it is a representation or an effect of something inaccessible to Sense is 
irrelevant to saying that the red patch as such is exactly as it appears. This directness 
and immediacy of the state of mind to its object is a harmony between Sense and 
Reason in Coleridge’s schema. 
Whereas belief, opinion, understanding through the concepts, using empirical 
generalizations, and dianoic thinking involve an inevitable distance between the thing 
thought and the thinking, this epistemological gap is not held to exist in Plato’s 
account of noesis, called Reason in Coleridge’s system. In noesis, the mind is in a 
state of direct contemplation of the Idea. Indeed, even that formulation implies a 
distance or difference that is not intended in the account of the Middle Platonists and 
of, later, the neo-Platonists. For them, a more accurate account is to say that in the act 
of contemplating an Idea, the contemplation is identical with the Idea. There is no 
Idea on one side with the thought of it on the other side. This does not mean, however, 
that a Platonic Idea is an “idea” in the ordinary sense of the word, denoting something 
mental, or that can only exist in a mind. The translation of “eidos” and “idea” into 
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“Idea” can lead to such mistakes, and of course the alternative translation, “Form”, is 
not less prone to being misunderstood. 
Draw a triangle and it is obvious in what respects this concrete image is only 
indirectly related to the Idea or Form of the triangle. No matter how sharp the pencil, 
there will always be inaccuracies. Also, the drawn triangle will have lines of a specific 
length, which would be a serious limitation on its usefulness if the same were true of 
the Form of the triangle. Perhaps more importantly, the Idea of the triangle has perfect 
mathematical lines. That is to say, its lines have length, but no width. When this point 
is grasped, it becomes obvious that the Form of the triangle can never be drawn.  
Now close your eyes and imagine three points, then imagine three lines so that two 
lines intersect each point. Here the imagination can bring us closer, although even 
here, the imagined triangle has specific angles, if we must imagine three points with 
specific relations to each other, even though it has shaken off the inessential details of 
line width and specific length. The angles in the Form of the triangle have a sum of 
180 degrees, but the specific number of degrees in any of those angles is, in this 
context, an inessential particularity. 
 I have proposed a proto-Romantic Plato who sometimes has been interpreted 
as being at odds with his own more linear, logical expositions. This proto-Romantic, 
poetic Plato was not merely an interpretation of Plato by the Romantics, but can be 
justified by inconsistencies in Plato (within single dialogues, and not only from book 
to book) between his poetic word-paintings and his more ‘straight’ expositions and 
discussions, that is, in dialectic. 
The place of imagination in Coleridge’s system is a revision of the place of 
its counterparts in Plato, aisthesis, eikasia, and phantasia. None of Plato’s terms here 
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really stood for what Coleridge meant by imagination, the secondary imagination at 
work in poetry and philosophy,  There is a sense of what Coleridge meant by 
imagination in Plato, and that is in the implicit Plato, where Plato takes recourse to 
poetic description to gesture towards the noetic Forms that cannot be described with 
the concepts and mathematika of dianoia, or the understanding.  For Plato 
imagination, described as aisthesis, eikasia, and phantasia, occupies the lowest level 
of thought, whereas for Coleridge it represents the only form through which the mind 
can access Ideas, considered as intellectual objects beyond concepts. 
Proto-Romantic, poetic Plato saw the need for a poetic vision necessary for 
aisthesis/eikasia to experience beauty as ideal and astonishing. This Plato, most 
prominent in Phaedrus, Symposium, Timaeus, and Book VII of Republic, was 
undoubtedly at self-questioning rather than dogmatic, most lucidly and explicitly in 
the Parmenides. Without doubt there was another side to Plato, the esoteric side, 
being the Plato who gave his most thorough explanations in the lectures and 
discussions in his Academy, the most thorough record of which, tiny though it is, 
being Aristotle's bemused account of Plato's lecture on The Good. 
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